


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SECURITY COOPERATION WITH CHINA: Analysis and a Proposal

Thomas L. Wilborn



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
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SECURITY COOPERATION WITH CHINA: ANALYSIS AND A PROPOSAL

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FOREWORD

Relations between the United States and China reached their lowest point in almost 20 years when President Bush imposed sanctions on Beijing after the People's Liberation Army (PLA) indiscriminately fired at unarmed demonstrators and their supporters at Tiananmen Square on June 4, 1989. In the intervening years, some U.S. contacts, particularly trade, quickly attained or exceeded their pre-Tiananmen level. However, until recently, the U.S. Government resisted reestablishing formal security links.

In this study, Dr. Wilborn examines U.S.-China security cooperation before Tiananmen, the strategic context in which it took place, and the strategic environment of U.S.-China relations at the present time. He then concludes that the reasons which justified the program of security cooperation with China during the cold war are irrelevant today.

Security cooperation and military-to-military relations with China are highly desirable in the strategic environment of the 1990s. China is a major regional power which inevitably will affect U.S. security interests, and the PLA is an extremely important institution within that nation. Additionally, as a member of the U.N. Security Council and one of the five acknowledged nuclear powers, China's actions can influence a wide range of U.S. global interests. In the future, China is likely to be even more powerful and its actions more significant for the United States.

Structurally, renewed U.S.-China security cooperation can be modeled on the program of the 1980s. However, the purpose of the high level visits, functional exchanges, and technological cooperation will no longer be to strengthen a strategic alliance against a common enemy, as it was before, but to contribute to stability in an important region of the world and to achieve U.S. global objectives.

This study fulfills a requirement in SSI's research program for 1994, *Strategic Challenge During Changing Times*. The

Institute is grateful for a grant from the Institute of National Security Studies of the U.S. Air Force Academy, which partially supported Dr. Wilborn's field research, and offers this monograph as a contribution to the ongoing dialogue on U.S. strategy in Asia and the Pacific.

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "William W. Allen". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a long horizontal stroke extending to the right.

WILLIAM W. ALLEN
Colonel, U.S. Army
Acting Director
Strategic Studies Institute

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

THOMAS L. WILBORN, a Research Professor of National Security Affairs, is an Asian specialist with the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College. His recent publications include *Japan's Self-Defense Forces: What Dangers to Northeast Asia?; Stability, Security Structures, and U.S. Policy for East Asia and the Pacific; Roles for the Army in a Peacetime Engagement Strategy for the Pacific*; and *How Northeast Asians View Their Security*, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1994, 1993, 1992, and 1991, respectively; and "Arms Control and R.O.K. Relations with the D.P.R.K.," *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*, Winter 1990. He is also author or coauthor of several other studies and articles related to Asian security, nuclear doctrine, and NATO. Before joining the Institute in 1975, Dr. Wilborn taught international relations and political science at James Madison University and Central Missouri University, and served on a University of Kentucky educational assistance group working at the Institut Teknologi Bandung, Bandung, Indonesia. He received the Ph.D. degree in political science from the University of Kentucky.

SUMMARY

Suspended for 5 years after the Tiananmen Square massacre, the United States and China have renewed the security cooperation relationship initiated in 1983.

From 1971, when National Security Advisor Henry A. Kissinger visited Beijing to affect rapprochement with China, until 1983, security cooperation between the two nations was sporadic and limited, even though their common opposition to the Soviet Union was the basis of the relationship. However, by 1983, adventurist moves by the Soviet Union, including the invasion of Afghanistan, coupled with an understanding between Washington and Beijing concerning U.S. relations with Taiwan, had set the conditions for a more extensive and systematic program.

U.S.-China policy called for "three pillars" of security cooperation: high level visits, functional exchanges, and sales of defensive weapons and weapons technology. In fact, frequent high level visits involved the key defense and military figures of each nation.

However, functional exchanges, organized by individual services and only begun in 1985, were limited and engaged relatively few mid-level officers from both sides. The initiative for these exchanges appears to have come from the United States. By 1988, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) had begun to withdraw from the functional exchange program between its ground forces and the U.S. Army.

The last "pillar," arms sales, turned out to be limited, also. The PLA sought only a few systems, although it discussed a broad array of weapons and equipment with U.S. Government and defense industry representatives. The PLA entered into four Foreign Military Sales Agreements and several commercial contracts involving relatively small purchases when compared to other U.S. customers, including Taiwan. President George Bush suspended all aspects of security cooperation in June 1989.

Had the events of Tiananmen Square not abruptly interrupted the U.S.-China security cooperation program, significant alterations would probably have begun to occur anyway. The profound changes which have transformed the international system and brought an end to the cold war were already in progress in 1989. U.S.-Soviet relations were no longer confrontational and, more importantly, President Mikhail Gorbachev had conceded virtually all Chinese preconditions to Sino-Soviet rapprochement. Washington and Beijing are renewing security cooperation at a time when the trends which were unfolding in 1989 have already resulted in a new decentralized international system. The cold war and one of the protagonists have disappeared. Thus, the strategic rationale which justified U.S.-China security cooperation in the 1970s and 1980s is no longer valid.

But the United States and China are key factors respectively in each other's foreign and security policy calculations. As a major East Asian power, China's behavior inevitably affects regional stability, and also influences U.S. global interests. Security cooperation, supplementing other aspects of binational relations, increases the ability of the United States to influence and be better informed about China and the PLA. It is also important for the United States to improve its contacts with China's military because as an institution the PLA performs critical political and economic roles within China.

Structurally, renewed U.S.-China security cooperation can be modeled on the program of the 1980s. However, the purpose of the high level visits, functional exchanges, and technological cooperation will no longer be to strengthen a strategic alliance against a common enemy, but instead to contribute to stability in an important region of the world and to the attainment of U.S. global objectives.

Three other important characteristics should be included in renewed U.S. security cooperation with China. These are:

- Policy direction centralized in OSD;
- Relatively slow, deliberate pace; and

-
- Transfer of only defensive weapons which cannot be used against Chinese civilians or seen to endanger regional power balances.

SECURITY COOPERATION WITH CHINA: ANALYSIS AND A PROPOSAL

INTRODUCTION

After a hiatus of almost 5 years, the United States and the People's Republic of China (PRC) have resumed security cooperation and military-to-military relations. Exchanges of high level visits are taking place again, and students from the U.S. Air War College and the National Defense University are visiting Beijing. The U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) and the People's Liberation Army (PLA) have reestablished military-to-military contacts. And Washington and Beijing have agreed to establish a binational commission on defense conversion, through which the United States will help the PLA adapt some of its systems, beginning with air traffic control, for civilian uses.¹

Despite ideological differences and historical animosity, the United States and China initially established a program of security cooperation at the height of the cold war as an expression of a common strategic interest in restraining the Soviet Union. By the late 1980s, the two governments were regularly exchanging high level visits of defense and military officials and military delegations were probing common functional problems. The United States had also approved a few weapons sales to the People's Liberation Army (PLA). But on June 4, 1989, before CNN cameras, PLA units fired indiscriminately into demonstrators in Tiananmen Square and their supporters in Beijing, killing at least 700 and wounding thousands.² As a result, President George Bush suspended all U.S. contacts with the Chinese military and imposed commercial sanctions on China. His administration did not resume military-to-military relations with the PLA.

Security cooperation between the United States and China in the 1990s and beyond obviously is no longer required as a means to contain Soviet expansion. The Soviet Union's

principal successor, Russia, is not an enemy (although perhaps a potential longer-term adversary) of either nation. The strategic justification for resuming this relationship spawned in the cold war is now based on a different set of factors and priorities.

The purpose of the following analysis is to propose the outline of a new U.S.-PRC security cooperation program, based on the political and strategic context of the 1990s. It begins with a summary of previous security cooperation between the two nations, in order to find hints of the more—and less—effective ways to engage China in military-to-military relations, and simply to provide an account of the earlier relationship. That is followed by an analysis of the current environment of U.S.-China relations, focusing on how the behavior of China, and specifically the PLA, may impinge on U.S. security interests and identifying potential risks and benefits of security cooperation with China. Then the author provides his suggestions for U.S.-PRC security cooperation. The final section is a restatement of the major conclusions of the analysis.

SECURITY COOPERATION BEFORE 1989

Virtual enemies for two decades after the Chinese Communist Party assumed control of China in 1949, the secret diplomacy of Henry Kissinger and Zhou Enlai in 1971 and President Nixon's extensively reported visit to Beijing in 1972 transformed relations between China and the United States. But outstanding disputes, in particular U.S. recognition of the Republic of China government in Taiwan and the war in Vietnam, prevented establishing full diplomatic relations, including formal security cooperation or regular military-to-military contacts. Indeed, as late as 1980 there were many officers in the U.S. armed services who still viewed the PRC as the enemy who had caused tens of thousands of casualties among American forces during the Korean war, and there were probably PLA officers with similar views of the United States.³

Nixon and Carter Administrations.

In the period between Nixon's visit and the normalization of U.S.-China relations in 1979, the United States and China supported each other diplomatically against the Soviet Union, and took similar positions with respect to ASEAN and, after 1975, Vietnam. But security cooperation was extremely limited.⁴ Washington reportedly shared intelligence on the Soviets with Beijing from Kissinger's first visit onward, often through the Chinese mission to the United Nations.⁵ These intelligence briefings became increasingly frequent in the year before normalization, and included a special NATO briefing for Mao and Zhou.⁶ The developing U.S.-China trade did not include weapons systems or military equipment, but the Ford administration did authorize the sale of American-produced sophisticated computers to Beijing. In 1978, Washington withdrew its opposition to weapons sales to China by Western European nations, even though no sales of military equipment or weapons by American companies were permitted.

Upon *de jure* recognition of each other in 1979, more extensive contacts in all aspects of relations, including security cooperation, were possible. Deng Xiaoping, back in China after his memorable 1979 tour of the United States, told a group of visiting U.S. Senators that China would be interested in exchanging port calls, purchasing U.S. arms, and having American monitoring facilities on Chinese soil to verify Soviet compliance with arms control agreements. Nonetheless, the only military contact in 1979 was the visit of a U.S. National Defense University (NDU) delegation to Beijing and several other cities. Planned before normalization, the group was "unofficially" hosted by the PLA. NDU hosted a PLA group the next year.⁷ A delegation from the Corps of Engineers visited China in early 1980, consulting with its hosts on flood control and similar topics, but not military affairs.⁸

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 profoundly changed the environment of Sino-American relations, and in the following year, when Secretary of Defense Harold Brown visited Beijing, he discussed the sale of nonlethal military equipment and the formation of a military relationship with

China. The Brown visit resulted in agreement for a wider range of military-to-military activities and a U.S. commitment to sell dual-purpose technology and nonlethal equipment—but not weapons systems. According to newspaper reports, the United States and China also agreed to covertly establish two facilities to monitor Soviet missile tests, which at least partially compensated for similar facilities lost when Moslem fundamentalists took control of the government of Iran the previous year.⁹

While military sales issues were not satisfactorily resolved in this period—China wanted to be able to purchase U.S. equipment on the same basis as other friendly, nonallied nations—the broader strategic relationship between the United States and China seemed to improve significantly. The policies of both nations with regard to a number of questions, including Cambodia, Afghanistan, and American military presence in the Pacific and East Asia, approached congruence. There were also limited military-to-military exchanges. A PLA educational delegation visited the United States in the fall of 1980. Reciprocating the visit, a U.S. group representing the various war colleges and several other service schools went to China in 1981.¹⁰ And in the economic and cultural arenas, contacts grew increasingly more frequent and varied.

Reagan Administration.

The Reagan administration, after a 2-year hiatus, further expanded security cooperation with Beijing to reinforce and strengthen the strategic alignment of the United States and China against the Soviet Union.¹¹ The period from 1981 until August 1983 was spent in extensive negotiations, resulting in a Sino-U.S. Joint Communiqué.¹² Through it, Washington surrendered some of its independence in fulfilling U.S. obligations to the security of Taiwan under the Taiwan Relations Act, even though Reagan and some of his supporters clearly felt a personal and ideological commitment to the Nationalist regime.¹³ For its part, Beijing, while it would not renounce the use of force against Taiwan, did state that its policy was to reunify the Motherland peacefully, and accepted

without approval that the United States would continue to contribute to the security of Taiwan.

The new program of security cooperation, announced in the summer of 1983 by Secretary of Defense Weinberger in Beijing, consisted of "three pillars": comprehensive high level visits, functional exchanges which allowed the PLA and U.S. armed forces to explore common problems and interests, and the sale of U.S. defensive weapons, military equipment, and technology to China.¹⁴ While Beijing participated in the activities of all three dimensions, Washington initiated the program and was its principal champion.

High Level Visits. Virtually all of the top leadership of the U.S. Department of Defense and services made trips to China. Casper Weinberger, in Beijing when the program started in 1983, went again in 1986, and his successor, Frank C. Carlucci, visited in 1988. The Secretaries of the Air Force and Navy also visited, and the Secretary of the Army sent a personal representative.¹⁵ On the military side, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and all of the service chiefs travelled to China between 1985 and 1989.¹⁶

The traffic from Beijing to Washington was also impressive. It included a Minister of Defense, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, Chief of the General Staff, Deputy Chief of the General Staff, PLA Air Force and Navy Commanders, the Air Force Political Commissar, and PLA Equipment Department Head. At least as far as participation is concerned, the high level visit portion of U.S.-China security cooperation must be considered a success for as long as it lasted.

Functional Exchanges. The second pillar of U.S.-China security cooperation, functional exchanges, was implemented on the American side by the individual services, each of which approached the requirements differently. The Army delegated responsibility to the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) which established with the PLA General Staff a binational annual meeting on training, to alternate between the United States and China.¹⁷ Always funded generously and given strong command support on the U.S. side, two Chinese delegations visited the United States, and two U.S. delegations

visited China. Delegations consisted of 9 or 10 people, headed by a one or two star general or equivalent.¹⁸ The visitors were always given a broad exposure to the host's training facilities, and also the opportunity to see many parts of the host's country.¹⁹

There were never very many people on either side involved in this program, although those few on each side with responsibilities for planning and liaison developed effective working relations. In the opinion of U.S. participants, professional and personal relationships at the working level were uniformly forthright and open—even warm. Both U.S. and Chinese participants in the exchanges appeared to consider their experiences professionally valuable. TRADOC had proposed, but the PLA had not accepted, more comprehensive functional exchanges and educational exchanges in 1988 and 1989.

The Air Force and the Navy had less structured functional exchanges. The Air Force hosted PLA Air Force (PLAAF) exchanges on training and maintenance, each of which the PLAAF reciprocated.²⁰ Like the Army exchanges, the participants appeared to value the experiences and supported extension of the exchanges. The U.S. Air Force and the PLAAF were considering exchanges on storage and restoration and other activities, including educational exchanges, when the United States suspended all programs because of Tiananmen. According to one of the closest observers to these activities, the PLAAF—or at least influential members of the PLAAF leadership—wanted to emulate selected USAF doctrine and practice, and did in fact adopt some changes based on the USAF model.²¹ In addition to the functional exchanges, the Air Force sent their prized aerial demonstration team, the Thunderbirds, to Beijing in 1987.

For the Navy, three port calls, two by U.S. ships to Qingdao (1986) and Shanghai (1989), and one by PLA Navy (PLAN) ships to Pearl Harbor (1989), constituted the functional exchange pillar of U.S.-China security cooperation. In addition to being high-level protocol events—Commander, Pacific Fleet, and Commander, Seventh Fleet, led the visits to Qingdao and Shanghai respectively—the port calls also involved discussions

about navy systems and procedures. Because the PLAN had expressed interest in gas turbine technology and the HH2 Foxtrot Seasprite helicopter, those systems were included in the 1986 three-ship visit to Qingdao. There were also meeting and passing exercises in conjunction with all three port calls.²²

Arms Sales and Technology Transfers. The third pillar, arms sales and technology transfers, produced considerable publicity but little actual activity.²³ The PRC received Foreign Military Sales (FMS) customer status in 1984, but it sought only a few projects. The PLA also bought very little through regular commercial channels. Table 1 shows the totals for arms sale agreements and actual deliveries from 1977 through 1992. By way of comparison, U.S. military sales to Taiwan exceeded sales to China in agreements and actual deliveries each year from 1977 through 1992. Total deliveries to China for the entire period were exceeded by deliveries to Taiwan in *each single* year during that period. In terms of volume of items or costs, arms sales to China never reached the level of a major military sales program.

Extensive discussions about arms sales and technology transfers did take place between the two governments and between the PLA and U.S. manufacturers. With limited resources and some appreciation that there were limits to what the PLA could absorb, Chinese representatives engaged more in window shopping than in buying. Whereas U.S. vendors offered large volumes of end items for sale, Chinese (when they were interested at all) sought only a few items and technology. Whether China's purpose was more to gain information about American weapons systems than to buy materiel, as has been suggested, is unclear, but undoubtedly PLA specialists did learn much about U.S. technology, as well as the lore of defense acquisition and the intricacies of foreign military sales in the United States.²⁴

The Reagan administration limited its offers to four groups of weapons systems, all considered defensive: anti-tank missiles, artillery and artillery defense, air defense, and anti-submarine warfare. As it turned out, the PLA made purchases only in the last three categories.²⁵

Fiscal Year	FMS Agreements	Commercial Export Deliveries	FMS Deliveries	Total Deliveries
(Thousands of U.S. dollars)				
1977		1,023		1,023
1978		0		0
1979		0		0
1980		622		622
1981		0		0
1982		1,000		1,000
1983		209		209
1984*	631	5,822	6	5,828
1985	421	56,857	424	57,281
1986	36,045	36,282	547	36,829
1987	254,279	30,589	3,887	34,476
1988	14,057	28,941	39,078	68,019
1989	412	17,918	99,616	117,534
1990	0	3,958	0	3,958
1991	0	2,600	30	2,630
1992	0	436	0	436
1993#	0	0	11,642	11,642
Totals	305,845	186,257	155,230	341,487

* China became eligible for FMS in 1984.

Deliveries under programs suspended in 1989.

Sources: Security Assistance Agency, *Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales and Military Assistance Facts*, Washington: Department of Defense, 1983 and 1993.

Table 1.
U.S. Military Sales to China, 1977-93.

The largest single program was an FMS \$550 million agreement involving upgrading avionics on 50 Chinese F-8 interceptor aircraft, called the "Peace Pearl" project. The primary contractor was the Grumman Corporation. Grumman's urgency to obtain the contract and the PLA's obsession with secrecy combined to prevent the contractor from knowing that the cockpit of each of the 50 aircraft was unique, requiring

individual adjustments which increased the costs significantly. Grumman accordingly demanded cost overruns, to the dismay of the PLA. The other three FMS programs were much smaller. They were:

- A \$22 million large scale ammunition program (LCAMP), in which Hamilton/Bulova modernized fuse and detonator facilities for China.²⁶
- A \$62 million project for four counter-battery radars. Hughes Corporation was the American contractor, and training of PLA personnel was conducted at Fort Sill, Oklahoma.
- An \$8 million sale of four Honeywell anti-submarine torpedoes.

The largest commercial sale, a \$140 million agreement, involved the purchase of 24 UH-60A Blackhawk helicopters, produced by the Sikorsky Corporation. There was also an agreement with Grumman to upgrade another fighter, the F-7M, for export, and some smaller sales.

Of the FMS agreements, only the LCAMP project was close to completion on June 4, 1989, when President Bush suspended all aspects of security cooperation with China. Two of the four radars from Hughes had been delivered, but none of the Honeywell torpedoes. Production had not begun on the Peace Pearl program, and the cost overruns had soured relations with Grumman in any case, leading the PRC to terminate the project in 1990 even though several F-8 aircraft were being held by Grumman at its New York factory.²⁷ The sale of Blackhawks was the only significant commercial sale completed. Some 3 years after Tiananmen, China finally received all of the undelivered items which it had purchased, as well as F-8s being held by the Grumman Corporation.²⁸

Intelligence Cooperation. There was apparently another dimension of U.S.-China security cooperation (a fourth pillar, so to speak) in the intelligence sharing and combined intelligence activities which dated back to 1972 and 1980, respectively. In addition to the facilities established to monitor Soviet missile tests in 1980, some five primary seismic

research stations were placed in several Chinese provinces between 1980 and 1984.²⁹ According to a detailed report leaked to *The Washington Post*, these activities were not affected by the U.S. response to Tiananmen Square.³⁰ Never acknowledged officially by either government, it is unclear if these operations are still maintained.

Status of the Relationship, 1988-89.

There is evidence that the pace of U.S.-China security cooperation might have waned even if the Tiananmen incidents had not taken place. In 1988, the PLA not only would not expand functional exchanges with the U.S. Army, but it desired to suspend the annual training dialogue for an unspecified time.³¹ Had all programs not been suspended, the PLA might have relented and agreed to a somewhat modified program for the future. But there clearly were reasons for the Chinese to withdraw from, or at least slow down, security cooperation with the United States.

On the pragmatic level, the costs in money and resources and the requirements for reciprocity may have imposed greater burdens than the PLA was willing to continue. While the costs of entertaining a visiting delegation in China were less than in the United States, they were still considerable, and the PLA budget was constrained. There was a particular strain on the relatively small group of personnel who were proficient in English. Moreover, the U.S. Army and Air Force were discussing a number of longer term educational and training exchanges which would be more expensive, and also would provide opportunities for a deeper understanding of the host's operations. The PLA claimed that it did not have living accommodations and quality of life facilities which would be expected as a minimum by U.S. servicemen. Rather than having to confront the possible embarrassment of providing—or being unable to provide—reciprocity, the PLA leadership may have decided to restrain and reduce the exchange programs to keep them well within the capacities of the PLA. On the other hand, the PLA leadership simply may not have wanted an educational exchange with the United States if it provided U.S. officers the opportunity to become familiar with the inner

workings of the PLA, and exposed Chinese officers to the relatively open intellectual environment of U.S. military institutions. In any case, the ad hoc approach of the Air Force, which allowed the PLAAF to more easily reject specific proposals, may have been more compatible to the wishes of the PLA leadership than the more structured and durable arrangements which had been fostered by the Army.

Strategically, the Chinese leadership must have considered that the initial rationale for Sino-American entente had all but evaporated in the wake of Gorbachev's "new thinking" and the rapidly emerging rapprochement between China and the Soviet Union. Rather than posing a threat to China's vital interests, the Soviet Union under Gorbachev had, by the spring of 1989, conceded all requirements which Deng had made prerequisites to normalizing relations. Moreover, there were possibly interesting prospects for security cooperation again with the Soviet Union.

From the U.S. perspective, detente had similarly undermined the logic of continuing to advance security cooperation with China, although in 1988 and 1989 most civilian and military security officials in Washington still considered the Soviet Union the global adversary of the United States. U.S. officials were also bothered by China's pattern of arms sales, especially the sale of Silkworm missiles to Iran and of a CSS-2 intermediate range ballistic missile to Saudi Arabia. Beijing considered that complaints about China's relatively modest arms sales program on the part of the second largest weapons merchant in the world were inappropriate, at the very least.³²

CURRENT ENVIRONMENT FOR U.S.-CHINA SECURITY COOPERATION

Few if any observers in Beijing or Washington predicted in 1989 the revolutionary events of the next several years which have so drastically transformed the international system. Not only has the bipolar world of the cold war ended, but one of its protagonists, the Soviet Union, no longer exists, and its successor states, including Russia, are in disarray. The

principal reason for both nations to engage in security cooperation with each other disappeared with the dismemberment of the Soviet Union, if not sooner. If there are strategic reasons for China and the United States to regularize security relations with each other, they can no longer be based on mutual fear of a common enemy posing a clear and present threat.³³ But they can be found in the needs of each nation to influence the behavior of the other in order to attain its objectives in the region.

China's Influence on U.S. East Asia Policy.

PRC's Global and Regional Capabilities. For the United States, China today is an important actor in both the international and regional environments. While it is in no sense a superpower, it has significant global capacities which can influence the success of U.S. policies, and it has the potential to wield even greater influence in the future. It is a member of the U.N. Security Council with a veto, and can therefore frustrate or, at the least, strongly influence any U.S. policy which requires a Security Council decision. As a self-proclaimed "Third World" state, increasingly successful in an economic and military sense, it has the ability to influence other Third World governments, either in support of or in opposition to U.S. global interests. Because it is one of the five acknowledged nuclear powers, China is central to restraining the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology. Lastly, it is an important exporter of arms which sells relatively sophisticated missiles to customers that the United States considers dangerous, including Iran, Syria, and Libya.³⁴

Regionally, China's ability to influence events and affect U.S. interests is probably more significant. East Asia is the most dynamic region in the world economically, accounting for ever increasing volumes of U.S. trade, and offering increasing opportunities for U.S. investments. Moreover, it is a region particularly vulnerable to instability caused by the emergence of historic rivalries and disputes partially restrained during the cold war by the strictures of the bipolar system.³⁵ Unlike Europe, there are no tested region-wide institutions like NATO and CSCE which show promise for mediating among

disputants or providing channels for peaceful change. The behavior of the region's largest state with the largest armed forces and the fastest growing economy obviously will influence regional stability and U.S. regional interests. In addition, China is one of the few nations remaining in the world with the capability, as diminished as it may be, of influencing Kim Jong Il's regime in North Korea, or the State Law and Order Restoration Council in Burma, both governments with which the United States has limited influence.

As many observers are increasingly pointing out, the PRC is also a potential regional problem.³⁶ As its economy provides greater resources to pursue international objectives, China cannot be expected to support all aspects of the status quo. Motivated by a strong nationalism which transcends other ideological boundaries, Chinese leaders will want to reclaim the international status they believe that their nation has been denied since the age of imperialism, and they should be expected to want the capabilities to act as a major power.³⁷ The increases in China's formal defense budgets since Tiananmen, the obsessive secrecy surrounding actual expenditures and capabilities of the military, the adoption of a new doctrine which openly incorporates power projection in the national military strategy, and the recent modernization of its navy and air force raise the possibility and fear, especially in Taiwan and Southeast Asia, of assertive intentions.

Moreover, numerous contentious issues could serve as the catalyst for regional conflict. Almost all of the actual and nascent territorial disputes in East Asia involve China. These include China with India on the south, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan on the west, Russia and Mongolia on the north; and Japan, Brunei, Malaysia, Philippines, and Vietnam on the east.³⁸ And for the United States, there is the always sensitive and potentially dangerous question of the status of Taiwan.

Potential Impact of Chinese Domestic Problems. A serious political crisis within China could be destabilizing for the entire region. Groups contending for power might seize on border issues, or even the return of Taiwan to the control of the PRC, as rallying cries to solidify domestic support. Even if domestic politics did not directly extend into the international arena,

weak, less effective governance from Beijing and conflict among the provinces in the context of a succession struggle will have repercussions throughout East Asia.

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is about to enter one of the most critical periods of its history, at least as serious as the previous crises associated with the Cultural Revolution, the death of Mao, or Tiananmen Square. Paramount leader Deng Xiaoping, who still sets the broad outlines of Chinese policy even though he holds no official position in the Party or government, turned 90 years of age in 1994. His passing will intensify the succession struggle already under way, and inevitably introduce a period of greater instability and uncertainty. Moreover, this will also represent a generational change of enormous significance, for the next leader of the CCP and the PRC will not come from the revolutionary generation who survived the Long March and the civil war, and who with Mao established the People's Republic. Instead, he and his coterie will be members of the *nomenklatura*; technocrats and bureaucrats rather than revolutionary fighters. No matter how effective or wise, the new leader will be denied the source of legitimacy which all previous leaders enjoyed merely because they had participated in the great struggle for liberation. More than any of his predecessors, his ability to remain in power will depend on success in modernizing the economy and raising the standard of living of the population. He will not be able to rely on past glories.

China also faces serious challenges unrelated to succession. The nation is being battered by centrifugal forces emanating from the reforms which shifted much regulation of the economy to market forces rather than formal economic controls.³⁹ The most prosperous areas, most notably Guangdong, which includes Guangzhou (Canton) and several special economic zones (the fastest growing entities in the Chinese economy), resist Beijing's efforts to restrain export-driven economic growth in the interest of curbing inflation or achieving economic balance. A great deal of power over the economy has already devolved to provinces, cities, firms, and sometimes even foreign investors. Some political control has become decentralized also, and if economic

decentralization is not reversed, the authority of the central government as compared to local power centers will almost surely become weaker.

Economic inequality is a growing problem. The material well-being of most Chinese clearly is improving, but for some much more rapidly than for others. Many peasants appear to be left out, and believe that they are left out, of the general prosperity which has produced double-digit growth rates for the economy as a whole. The income gaps between city and countryside and between coastal areas and hinterland are getting larger, as urban and coastal rates of growth far outstrip those in the rest of China.⁴⁰

"Market socialism" not only has led to rapid economic growth and noticeable inequality by eliminating many of the mechanisms of a centrally planned economy, it has also undermined the ideology of Communism, and thus a basis for the Party's legitimacy. Corruption, not absent before the Deng reforms but certainly relatively limited, has become pervasive, obvious, and widely resented.⁴¹ The most prominent grievance expressed by the demonstrators at Tiananmen Square related to corruption, and not the absence of democracy. Violent crime, gambling, and prostitution, repressed in the days of monolithic Party control, are now serious and escalating problems in the special economic zones and the rapidly developing cities.⁴²

United States as a Factor in China's Security Calculus.

Chinese perceptions of the strategic significance of the United States cannot be mirror images of U.S. perceptions of the strategic significance of China. Each nation affects and is affected by the other in the context of different interests and capabilities and each represents a domestic political system which is almost the polar opposite of the other on the spectrum of democratic-authoritarian politics. But there are also similarities. As China can influence the ability of the United States to attain some of its objectives, so can the United States be either a facilitator or obstruction to China's achievement of its global and regional objectives, for the United States is the world's only superpower, it possesses the strongest military

capability, and it is the major customer of China's dynamic export sector. The United States also annoys and frustrates China's leaders because it supports the activities of dissidents, publicly rebukes certain domestic social and political practices, and tries to dictate policy relative to intellectual property rights and other trade-related procedures.

U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, especially the recent authorization for Taiwan to purchase 150 F-16s, and the imposition of sanctions because of Chinese trading practices are more than annoying—these actions touch on Beijing's fundamental security interests. In fact, a number of Chinese strategists and security analysts identify the United States as the primary enemy in the post-cold war era.⁴³ In any case, the United States is a major force in East Asian regional affairs and a major factor in China's economic development. Whether they like it or not—and clearly many of them do not—China's leaders must deal with the United States.

Potential Benefits of Security Cooperation.

The greater the variety of contacts in a bilateral relationship, especially when they include activities which are very important to both nations, the greater the points of access, and thus the greater the number of opportunities for each participant to gain information about the other and influence the behavior of the other. Therefore, engaging in security cooperation, including military-to-military relations, should be beneficial to both nations. First of all, it can complement economic, political, and cultural exchanges already in place, and thus give the bilateral association the appearance of a normal and comprehensive relationship. Security cooperation will not overcome disputes in the areas of human rights and trade, but it should contribute to greater balance and flexibility in U.S.-China relations.

Contacts between the U.S. and Chinese armed forces as part of the total network of bilateral connections are especially important for the United States because of the domestic political and economic roles of the PLA. It is highly unlikely that the PLA will dominate Chinese politics in the foreseeable future—"The Party controls the gun" is a regular theme of

propaganda toward the military, and civilian control in the form of the CCP over the military has rarely been in question in the PRC.⁴⁴ But CCP leaders, including Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, and many other important figures in the history of the PRC were also leaders of the PLA. Moreover, some members of the PLA always serve on the major organs of the Party, although this formal influence of the PLA within the Party has varied over the years. More significantly, the all-important personal links connecting the highest Party leadership and the PLA leadership have remained vital: PLA opinion is, and always has been, heard with sympathy at the highest levels of decisionmaking in China.

The PLA is also an extremely important actor in the Chinese economy. Encouraged to expand their existing relatively modest business activity in the early 1990s to supplement relatively meager appropriations, many PLA units, from the General Logistics Department to battalions in the field, developed a great variety of commercial interests, ranging from munitions to consumer products to traditional small-scale agricultural enterprises. They produce goods for export and for the domestic market. Reliable data are not available, but it is estimated that the PLA earned 30 billion yuan in 1992, or as much as the official defense budget.⁴⁵ In spite of criticism from outside and inside the military, the value of the PLA's commercial concerns has continued to grow, at least as fast as the economy as a whole.⁴⁶

Moreover, especially in times of crisis for the regime, as during the later stages of the cultural revolution and the demonstrations at Tiananmen Square, the PLA as an institution historically has played critical roles in preserving the system. The Communist Party of China is now at another critical period, with the survival of the regime possibly at risk. U.S.-China military-to-military relations may give the United States a better ability to anticipate the actions the PLA may take, and therefore also anticipate likely developments within the PRC. Possibly—but certainly not necessarily—in the mid and long terms it may be able to influence PLA decisions, and possibly even the political decisions of senior members of the PLA in their roles as leaders of the CCP.

Risks of Extensive Security Cooperation.

There are probably no political or military risks to the United States in modest security cooperation and military-to-military cooperation with China. But some types of security cooperation, or identification with the PLA which appears to be uncritical, do imply some dangers.⁴⁷

Popular dissatisfaction with the current regime also applies to the PLA. It has not escaped the pervasive corruption in China. Indeed, some observers believe that parts of the PLA are among the most corrupt elements of the system.⁴⁸ Beyond that, many in the population still hold the PLA responsible for the massacre at Tiananmen Square. Therefore, too close an identification with the PLA carries the risk of appearing to favor unpopular groups least likely to support the kind of government the United States would want to see created. This identification could also undermine the credibility of U.S. positions on human rights and democracy with other governments. In the event that there were a fundamental shift in government in Beijing, an unlikely development in the near term, too close an identification with the most repressive institution of the present regime would complicate U.S. access to new ruling groups, which probably would not include PLA leaders now influential in Beijing.

A danger also exists that security cooperation with China could have adverse affects on U.S. relations with other nations in the East Asia—especially China's most proximate neighbors. They favor normal relations between the United States and China, which they hope will help to deter China from destabilizing behavior.⁴⁹ But they would all object strongly if the United States provided assistance which strengthened the PLA's power projection capability.

There are also risks to the PRC in an extensive security cooperation relationship. Military-to-military relations would provide a new channel (in addition to trade, sports, educational exchanges, manipulation of international media, etc.) through which the United States might, from the Chinese perspective, attempt to subvert Chinese socialism through a campaign of peaceful evolution, a threat to PRC values which was heralded

in the Chinese press in 1990 and still receives some attention.⁵⁰ The extent to which the PRC leadership is willing to allow large numbers of PLA officers, especially younger ones, to interact with U.S. counterparts will be a good indication of either the former's confidence in their own position or faith in the loyalty and political training of the latter. Fairly active security cooperation can take place, as it did during U.S.-China security cooperation in the 1980s, without involving large numbers of people at any given time, however, so that this risk to the PRC leadership need not necessarily inhibit a renewed relationship. But any U.S. activity which was perceived as an effort to propagate the values of "bourgeois liberalism" would be strenuously resisted. Moreover, some PRC and PLA officials, acculturated to value secrecy in military affairs for its own sake, see risks in any exchange of information with a foreign government, particularly one with the capability to frustrate PLA plans and actions.

Parameters of U.S.-China Security Relations.

Security cooperation and military-to-military relations with China will not fit the typical pattern of U.S. security cooperation. Unlike most partners with the United States, China is not an ally or even a "friendly" state, as it might have been designated in the 1980s because of the strategic alliance against the Soviet Union. It is worth repeating that, in addition to some common international and global objectives which do justify collaboration, the policies of the United States and China diverge on a number of significant issues. They include the status of Taiwan, human rights, and a whole series of trade questions. Moreover, China is a party to disputes, although not actual conflict, with several nations which definitely are either allies or friends of the United States. And while Chinese communism has evolved so as to accept many features of a market economy, ideological differences between the present regime in Beijing and any possible government in Washington are fundamental. Nonetheless, even with such a complex relationship, China has been willing to resolve problems with the United States through dialogue and compromise. Conflict

and the threat of conflict have not been a part of U.S.-China relations since 1971.

The nature of the relationship with China means that the principal themes of U.S. military-to-military programs with other major regional states are inapplicable. The United States does not necessarily want to strengthen the military capability of China, which could threaten allies and friends in the region and disturb existing military balances. Interoperability should not be of primary concern because, except in certain types of operations other than war (e.g., humanitarian relief, anti-piracy operations, or perhaps U.N.-sponsored peacekeeping), military units of the United States and China are unlikely to serve together. Fighting side-by-side in medium to high intensity conflict is particularly difficult to imagine now or in the foreseeable future. Security assistance programs may have some role in future U.S.-China security cooperation, but China is unlikely to become either a major customer of U.S. armaments or military technology.

In addition to the political/strategic environment, cultural differences between the United States and China inhibit free exchanges of information and the development of understanding. This was true during the 1980s, when the anti-Soviet strategic alignment propelled personnel on each side to extend good will to those on the other. Today, without that strategic rationale and the existence of disagreements on a range of issues, cultural and ideological differences and stereotypes derived from them could become more obstinate barriers.

Professional military values and interests should compensate for some of the differences between the two societies, but the divergence between Chinese and American military ethos is also significant, especially in the case of ground forces. PLA ground forces are much less oriented toward technological approaches to warfare and more prone to accept political as well as military roles for the armed forces than other branches. They also appear to be more enmeshed in commercial activities, rarely considered acceptable within the U.S. military, than do the PLAAF and PLAN. In addition to these cultural factors, as in 1988-89, the PLA may not want to

endorse a rapid pace to security cooperation with the United States because of a shortage of resources. Its overall budget may be larger than during the 1980s, but it does not necessarily have more funds for security cooperation. Moreover, the most limiting resources may be trained, reliable English speaking personnel rather than money. (Budget and personnel restraints may restrict U.S. contributions to military-to-military relations with China in the future much more than was the case in the 1980s.)

While more extensive security cooperation and military-to-military relations with China can advance U.S. interests, they should be designed by American personnel familiar with China and the PLA, with cultural differences in mind. Even in the 1980s, the PLA appeared to prefer a slower, less structured approach than the American services, especially the Army. The PLA also was more hesitant than U.S. services to share information about its capabilities and organization. At least in the foreseeable future, the United States should agree to a relatively slow, cautious program which conforms to Chinese as well as American expectations. This warning may be especially necessary for U.S. military administrators of the program. Their culture places a premium, usually very appropriate and beneficial, on "can do": accomplishing the mission—in this case expanding security cooperation with the PLA—whatever the obstacles.⁵¹ But in this instance, the obstacles should not necessarily be defeated or overrun.

SUGGESTIONS FOR A SECURITY COOPERATION PROGRAM WITH CHINA

A security cooperation program with the PRC should include the basic components of the program of the 1980s—high level visits, functional exchange, and technological cooperation. However, given current and expected strategic relationships between the two nations, the content and priority attached to the program will differ from that of the earlier decade. Initial dialogues can seek out arenas in which common objectives provide the basis for more extended higher level discussions and military-to-military contacts.

The execution of U.S.-China security cooperation necessarily involves many segments of the defense community, all of which must have authority to carry out their missions. Nevertheless, in order to insure that all activities conform to U.S. policy, the overall coordination and direction should be centralized in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD/P), in close consultation with the Department of State. Ideally, China specialists will be available to direct all aspects of the program, or at least advise those who do.

In the discussions associated with high level visits, the United States should focus on areas in which U.S.-China cooperation may advance global and regional stability, as opposed to the former priority of strengthening their strategic alignment to deter the Soviet Union. Such issues would include arms and weapons technology transfers (including proliferation of weapons of mass destruction), drug trafficking, peaceful settlement of disputes, stability on the Korean peninsula, and confidence-building measures to reduce the secrecy surrounding PLA budgets and plans. Beijing and Washington will not agree or find compromises on all of these items, or other issues (e.g., Taiwan and the forward presence of U.S. forces in the region) which the former may not want to introduce during high level discussions. But even when agreement is not possible, exchanges of positions enhance understanding. And frequent dialogues can, at least in principle, lead to changes of policy. Hopefully, both governments will not publicly exaggerate disagreements. Confrontation for its own sake between China and the United States will not improve regional stability.

Functional exchanges offer the most promising prospects for establishing enduring military-to-military relationships. They can provide a means for the development of personal and institutional networks which can foster understanding and evolve into informal structures for cooperation and collaboration. Functional exchanges also can create opportunities for each side to gain new information about the other, and points of access for each side to influence the other. However, at least in the immediate future, functional

exchanges are not likely to involve many people on either side in reoccurring contacts. Thus, personal and institutional networks are likely to evolve slowly, only providing significant benefits of mutual understanding and informal collaboration in the mid and long term. Longer assignments and/or reassignments of service personnel involved in these programs might facilitate the development of such networks. During the first period of U.S.-China security cooperation, individual services administered functional exchanges and they presumably will also be the primary agents for functional exchanges in the future. However, at least one activity, the proposed binational commission on defense conversion, will be directly sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense.⁵² There may be opportunities for other binational commissions, perhaps examining demobilization, in the future.

Individual services will also share responsibility for functional exchanges with the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), which has been one of the first participants in the resumption of U.S.-China security relations. USPACOM not only has military-to-military programs in which the PLA can (and does) participate, but it may be in the best position to advise the USD/P from a joint perspective on the plans and activities of the individual services.

To stimulate mutual understanding, the major objective of U.S.-China functional exchanges in the post-cold war era, U.S. services should emphasize conferences on military history, strategy, and doctrine. They should also respond to requests from the PLA, which, especially in the case of the PLAAF and the PLAN, may be heavily oriented towards technology and more beneficial to Chinese than U.S. participants. U.S. negotiators and coordinators should insist that each exchange be at least potentially beneficial to the military organizations in each nation, however, or be balanced by another exchange that is. Each side in the relationship will always be entitled to a *quid pro quo*.

A prudent approach will not press for exchanges in areas where the Chinese do not seem to desire them. Where reciprocity may be a special problem for the PLA, U.S. administrators could suggest special arrangements by which

the PLA could avoid direct reciprocity without embarrassment if they believed the program would be particularly valuable for the United States.

While there were a number of exchanges of delegations considering education and training, there were no educational exchanges in the earlier period of security cooperation. Both the Army and the Air Force suggested educational exchanges, without positive responses from the PLA leadership. It is possible that the latter considered that the military education systems of the two countries were so different that reciprocal exchanges would be unworkable. PLA leaders may not have wanted to allow American students in Chinese military schools, especially at staff college and war college levels, for fear of breaches of security. Or perhaps the Chinese were unwilling to expose their officers to bourgeois liberalism in U.S. military schools. Most Western observers believe that this last reason was the most salient. In any case, given the Chinese lack of enthusiasm in the past, initiatives for educational exchange probably should come from the PLA.

There probably cannot be a successful program of security cooperation with China unless the PLA is allowed to purchase armaments and military equipment from U.S. weapons producers. Beijing would view denial as an affront, tantamount to naming China an outlaw state. However, for reasons of both domestic and international politics, an arms transfer program for China must be limited. As in the program of the Reagan and Bush administrations, when the political atmosphere was much more favorable than now, Washington should offer only clearly defensive systems which would not directly contribute to a force projection capability. Moreover, the United States should not authorize the PLA to buy weapons which it might use against Chinese citizens: under no circumstances may a future Tiananmen Square massacre involve American weapons or equipment. Within those constraints, even though opposition may be expected in Congress and segments of the public, China should be allowed to purchase from U.S. weapons manufacturers, and, if it wants it, enjoy Foreign Military Sales status.

Beijing, which only purchased a few U.S. weapons systems in the 1980s, is unlikely to become a major customer of U.S. defense industry in the future for at least four reasons. First, the suspension of all arms related programs after June 4, 1989, was unpleasant and extremely disruptive for the Chinese. From their perspective, American companies cannot be considered reliable when, in spite of binding legal contracts, the flow of supplies and technology can be interrupted by what they consider unjustified political decisions by the U.S. Government. Second, while the resources available to the PLA are greater than formerly, their funds for weapons and equipment acquisition, especially from foreign sources, are limited. They are unlikely to spend much money on imported weapons from all sources, and they will necessarily look for bargains. Third, the best prices for high technology items which cannot be produced in China are likely to be offered by the Russians, who also impose less red-tape than the United States. And fourth, Russian equipment is more compatible with existing Chinese weapons systems, most of which are based on Soviet designs, than U.S. equipment. Any requests from the PLA, except perhaps for spare parts for U.S. equipment already in its inventory, are unlikely to come soon, and they are likely to be very selective.

On the other hand, Chinese enterprises (not necessarily, but possibly, owned by the PLA) may seek a variety of dual-use items, such as advanced computers and information technology, alleging that they will be used within civilian sectors of their economy although they could also have military applications. Neither the Bush nor Clinton administration has been unduly restrictive in dealing with such requests, often very profitable to U.S. vendors. As in the past, they may be treated more as commercial, as opposed to security, transactions.

In addition to these programs there will be other dimensions to U.S.-China security cooperation, probably including intelligence sharing and cooperative intelligence activities. USPACOM's military-to-military programs can include PLA participants—PLA representatives have already attended a Pacific Armies Management Seminar sponsored by U.S. Army Pacific—if Beijing is interested. Air War College and NDU

programs which send groups of students abroad as a part of their educational experience, as well as CAPSTONE participants on worldwide orientation tours, should continue to include China on their itineraries as long as they are welcome.⁵³

SOME CONCLUSIONS

Assuming Washington designs and executes its participation sensibly, renewed U.S. security cooperation with China, including routine military-to-military contacts, supports stability in East Asia, the overarching U.S. regional security objective, and increases the opportunities to solicit Beijing's support in achieving some global objectives as well. To assure that U.S. objectives guide all activities, policy formulation should be centralized in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. However, the program, which should be framed primarily to increase mutual understanding rather than achieve operational cooperation, is unlikely to produce immediate or dramatic results.

The renewal of U.S. security cooperation with China, potentially the most influential nation in the region, strengthens stability in East Asia by supplementing other dimensions of Sino-American relations, thereby increasing U.S. involvement with China and—perhaps more significantly—enhancing the perception that the United States is fully engaged with the PRC. East Asian leaders view Sino-American consultations and dialogue, particularly when they explicitly involve security affairs, as one of the factors which could restrain China's behavior, were the need to arise. These leaders make decisions for their own nations partly on the basis of this perception. If security cooperation results in more transparency in China's defense system, an objective which the United States should pursue, the result would be even greater predictability and stability in East Asia.

In reality (as distinguished from the realm of perceptions), renewed security cooperation has not significantly enhanced U.S. influence in Beijing thus far, and probably will not do so in the near future. But it probably can expand the opportunities

for American officials to explain U.S. positions on nonproliferation, global environmental concerns, illegal narcotics traffic, terrorism, and other global issues, including some which may not have direct security implications. The United States will also have more frequent opportunities to persuade China to expand its recognition of human rights. In addition, PLA officers participating in military-to-military activities should be able to observe, and hopefully appreciate, U.S. counterparts functioning in accordance with Western human rights standards.

U.S.-China military-to-military relations should be kept at a level sufficient to keep an inter-military dialogue going but modest enough not to strain the capacity of either side. In offering weapons and military technology to the PLA, Washington must always consider regional military balances and the attitudes of other East Asian governments. Moreover, it must avoid selling the PLA weapons which might be used against its own population.

ENDNOTES

1. Steve Mufson, "U.S. to Help China Shift Arms Output to Civil Use," *The Washington Post*, October 18, 1994, p. 28.

2. The exact number of casualties is unclear. The official report listed over 200 dead, mostly military and security personnel, and 3,000 injured civilians and 6,000 injured military and security personnel. Chinese Red Cross officials initially reported 2,600 dead, but later denied the figure. Western newsmen estimated several thousand dead based on leaks from Chinese security personnel and checks of some Beijing hospitals. Far Eastern Economic Review, *Asia 1990 Yearbook*, Hong Kong, 1990, p. 110, estimates at least 700.

3. I heard many such comments from senior officers during an earlier examination of U.S.-China security in 1980-81.

4. The discussion of security cooperation, and the lack thereof, between 1971 and 1979 is based on Harry Harding, *A Fragile Relationship: The United States and China Since 1972*, Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1992, pp. 88-90; and George Lardner, Jr. and R. Jeffrey Smith, "Intelligence Ties Endure Despite U.S.-China Strain: 'Investment is Substantial, Longstanding,'" *The Washington Post*, June 25, 1989, pp. A1, A24.

5. Harding, p. 88, claims that data from satellite photography and intercept were provided the Chinese. See also Jim Mann, "U.S., China Coordinated Policy During Cold War," *Los Angeles Times*, June 13, 1994, p. 1.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 90.

7. Telephone interview on May 16, 1994, with Dr. Thomas Robinson, who as professor of Chinese studies at the National War College at the time, planned and organized the trip.

8. Interview with Colonel (retired) Douglas Lovejoy, June 10, 1994. Colonel Lovejoy was the China specialist in the Politico-Military Division, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Department of the Army, from 1979 until 1982.

9. Lardner and Smith, cited in Harding, p. 92.

10. Lovejoy interview. The U.S. delegation was headed by the Deputy Commander of Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).

11. Part of the explanation for the strained relations between China and the United States in 1981 was that candidate Reagan had made a series of pro-Taiwanese statements during the presidential campaign of 1980.

12. Reciprocal visits of delegations from advanced military educational institutions may have been the only military-to-military relations activities during the first 2 years of the Reagan administration.

13. The communique provides that U.S. arms sales to Taiwan would "not exceed, either in qualitative or in quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries," and that the United States intended "to reduce gradually its sale of arms to Taiwan."

14. Secretary of State Schultz had proposed the Weinberger visit in February, but Beijing would not extend the invitation until issues relating to Chinese textile exports and Huguang Railway bonds were resolved. Harding, pp. 142-143.

15. General Maxwell Thurman, who at the time was Commander of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). The visit occurred in 1988, when two of the four AN/TPQ-37 radars which China had purchased from Hughes had been delivered. During the visit, PLA crews which had trained at Fort Sill as part of the FMS procurement demonstrated the equipment.

16. A new Chief of Staff of the Army was planning a visit at the time of the Tiananmen incident.

17. The information about U.S. Army functional exchanges is based primarily on a telephone interview with Lieutenant Colonel Kevin M. Rice, USA, a Foreign Area Officer (FAO) specialist on China, who was the TRADOC action officer for the program until May 1988; Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Ronald G.S. Tom, a former China FAO, who was the China specialist in the Political-Military Division of the Army Staff from 1985 until 1988; and Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Jay Allen, also a former China FAO, who succeeded Colonel Rice in 1988 and served as the China specialist on the Army Staff until his retirement in 1994. Rice and Tom attended the first two meetings.

18. The PLA had abolished its rank structure; U.S. Army China specialists estimated rank on the basis of current and previous positions.

19. During a sight-seeing excursion at a large shopping mall in Atlanta in 1985, an American escort for the Chinese delegation happened to notice former President and Mrs. Carter riding on an escalator. They agreed to meet and be photographed with the Chinese. Colonel Rice thinks that the Chinese never believed that the encounter was a coincidence, although it fact it was.

20. The description of the Air Force programs was obtained primarily from Lieutenant Colonel Bernard C.W. Chang, USAF, who was utilized as an interpreter during the functional exchanges of the 1980s.

21. Lieutenant Colonel Chang.

22. Information on the Navy functional exchange was provided by Mr. Ted Tacket, Deputy Director for International Programs, U.S. Navy, and Commander Michael Matacz, political-military officer for China at Headquarters, Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet. Commander Matacz participated in both U.S. Navy port calls.

23. The arms sales and technology transfer programs with China are discussed in Harding, pp. 164-168; Eden Y. Woon, "Chinese Arms Sales and U.S.-China Military Relations," *Asian Survey*, Volume XXIV, Number 6, June 1989, pp. 601-618; Kerry B. Dumbaugh and Richard F. Grimmet, "Arms Sales to China: The Limits to U.S.-China Military Cooperation," *The Washington Quarterly*, Volume 9, Number 3, Summer 1986, pp. 89-102; and Larry M. Wortzel, "United States Export Control Policies and the Modernization of China's Armed Forces," in *China's Military Modernization: International Implications*, ed. by Larry M. Wortzel, Contributions in Military Studies, Number 72, New York: Greenwood Press, 1988, pp. 159-192.

24. Harding, p. 164.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 167, indicates that there was an FMS agreement to coproduce TOW anti-tank missiles in China. I could find no evidence that such an agreement was signed, however.

26. Bulova bought out Hamilton during the program.

27. Interview with Colonel R. Mark Bean, USAF, a former Air Attache in Beijing.

28. See U.S. Army Security Assistance Command, Country Point Paper, SUBJECT: China, 3 March 1993. The agreement between the United States and China which allowed shipment of the undelivered materiel was signed December 16, 1993.

29. Harding, p. 166.

30. George Lardner, Jr. and R. Jeffrey Smith, "Intelligence Ties Endure Despite U.S.-China Strain: 'Investment is Substantial, Longstanding,'" *The Washington Post*, June 25, 1989, p. A1.

31. Interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Jay Allen, USA, who succeeded Lieutenant Colonel Rice as TRADOC project officer for U.S.-China functional exchanges in 1988.

32. Woon argues that U.S. attitudes toward security cooperation with China had become largely a function of the latter's arms transfer policy by 1989, and that it would likely dominate security relations with China in the future. See especially pp. 614-618.

33. However, at least one Chinese has suggested that Russia will be a long-term threat to both nations which justifies continuous security cooperation. Richard C. Barnard and Barbara Opall, "U.S., China Resume Ties: High-Level Visits by Military May Spur Sanction Removal," *Defense News*, July 11-17, 1994, p. 1.

34. Compared to the United States, Russia, and Western European countries, the volume of China's arms trade is modest, however. See R. Bates Gill, *The Challenge of Chinese Arms Proliferation: U.S. Policy for the 1990s*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, August 31, 1993, pp. 1-12.

35. While it is true that East Asian politics were not subordinated to cold war considerations as much as in Europe, the bipolar structure nonetheless had a restraining impact on most powers. For a insightful presentation of this view, see Richard K. Betts, "Wealth, Power, and Instability: East Asia and the United States after the Cold War," *International Security*, Volume 18, Number 3, Winter 1993/94, pp. 34-77.

36. For example, see David Shambaugh, "Growing Strong: China's Challenge to Asian Security," *Security*, Volume 36, Number 2, Summer 1994, pp. 43-59; Nicholas D. Kristof, "China Builds Its Military Machine, Making Some Neighbors Nervous," *The New York Times*, January 11, 1993, p. A1; and William Branigin, "As China Builds Arsenal and Bases, Asians Wary of 'Rogue in the Region'," *The Washington Post*, March 31, 1993, p. A21.

37. Larry M. Wortzel, "China Pursues Traditional Great-Power Status," *Orbis*, Volume 38, Number 2, Spring 1994, pp. 157-176.

38. The remaining territorial dispute with Russia concerns the boundary along the Amur River. Japan and China both claim sovereignty to barren islets north of Taiwan named Senkakku in Japanese and Diaoyutai in Chinese. Brunei, Malaysia, Philippines, and Vietnam are in dispute with China, and to some degree with each other, over the Spratly Islands. Vietnam and China also dispute sovereignty over the Paracel Islands.

39. This discussion is primarily based on George Segal, "China Changes Shape: Regionalism and Foreign Policy," *Adelphi Paper 287*, March 1994.

40. Segal, p. 15. Lincoln Kaye, "Haves and Have-Nots," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, September 2, 1993, p. 46, speculates that the ratio of urban to rural income, which was 1.7:1 in 1985 after 7 years of Deng's agricultural reforms, was probably 4:1 in 1993. Official statistics place the ratio at 2.3:1.

41. *Ibid.*, pp. 26-27.

42. During the author's discussions with observers of Chinese politics in Hong Kong in March 1994, there was virtually unanimous agreement that the Communist Party of China is facing a serious crisis of legitimacy, and that the current leadership is unusually insecure.

43. Shambaugh, p. 49.

44. It is an article of faith of the CCP that the PLA is a servant of the Party. Since the Tiananmen massacres this has been the dominant theme of major military publications.

45. See Tai Ming Cheung, "Serve the People," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, October 14, 1993, pp 64-66; and Segal, p. 26.

46. "Hostile Takeover: China Reigns in PLA Businesses," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, February 17, 1994, p. 5. The number of concerns operated by the PLA, and the size of the revenue they generate, are matters of conjecture, even to the leaders of the PLA. Cheung, "Serve the People."

47. An American observer in Hong Kong, who does not want to be identified, warned against relations between the PLA and the American military which appeared to be "intimate."

48. Consensus of a group of Hong Kong specialists on China and the PLA in February 1994. Many of the generalizations concerning the PLA were derived from discussions in Hong Kong with a number of observers, often in animated conversations and discussions in which it was difficult to determine who was responsible for a given comment.

49. A strategy of ASEAN, which Beijing is resisting, appears to be to enmesh China in a network of regional and bilateral relationships. See Nayan Chanda, "Divide and Rule," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, August 11, 1994, p. 18.

50. Harry Harding, "'On the Four Great Relationships:' The Prospects for China," *Survival*, Volume 36, Number 2, Summer 1994, pp. 22-42, states that the mainstream press has not emphasized "peaceful evolution" since 1992. However, Shambaugh, p. 50, suggests that the concept still resonates among security specialists.

51. Several observers of U.S.-China security cooperation from within the American military, who spoke under nonattribution rules, commented on the inability of the administrators of the U.S. program to be patient and proceed at the pace desired by the Chinese.

52. This will be the first instance of security cooperation with China, except for arms sales, in which participants will be recruited from the private sector.

53. CAPSTONE is an orientation/training program for new flag officers and flag officer-designates administered by NDU.

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